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RETHINKING TAX PRIORITIES: MARRIAGE
NEUTRALITY, CHILDREN, AND CONTEMPORARY
FAMILIES
James M. Puckett*

Tax scholarship has long struggled with whether married taxpayers
should be taxed differently from unmarried taxpayers. Currently,
married taxpayers are subject to different tax rates than unmarried
taxpayers, and may file a joint tax return. A married couple may pay
a higher or lower amount of tax than an unmarried couple with the
same total income, and a single person generally pays more tax on a
given income than a married couple with a single earner with the
same income. These outcomes are difficult to reconcile with a
commitment to income tax progressivity, which in theory requires that
higher incomes be taxed at higher rates. Moreover, the system
penalizes some marriages, and benefits other marriages. This Article
takes a fresh look at the problem of marriage bonuses and penalties,
acknowledges that there may be difficulties with a separate filing
system, but concludes that the joint return and special rates for
married taxpayers should be abolished. In addition, drawing on the
work offamily law scholars, this Article argues that a stronger case
can be madefor supportingparenting ratherthan marriage in the tax
system.

* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. B.A. and J.D.,
University of Virginia; LL.M. (Taxation), New York University. I would like to thank Heidi Forman,
Marty Ginsburg, Lily Kahng, Mitchell Kane, Ron Krotoszynski, Laurie Malman, Robin Wilson, and
George Yin. I wish to take a moment to remember Marty Ginsburg, who passed away shortly before
this Article went to press. As many others have noted, besides being a phenomenal tax lawyer and a
great mentor, Marty had a delightful sense of humor-he will be sorely missed. On a lighter note, I will
even miss competing with Marty for the limited supply of Diet Dr. Pepper at Fried Frank's Tax
Department lunches. I am grateful to Dean Ken Randall for inviting me to teach and pursue my
scholarship as a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Alabama School of Law during
the 2009-2010 academic year. The University of Alabama School of Law provided research support
during the 2009-2010 academic year, and the Seattle University School of Law provided research
support during the summer of 2009 and the summer of 2010, all of which greatly facilitated my work on
this Article. Any errors or omissions are, of course, my own responsibility.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Congress and tax scholars have struggled for decades with the
question of how, if at all,' the federal income tax system should take
into account a taxpayer's ties with a spouse, partner, child, or other
family members or dependents. Currently, such considerations affect
tax liability in many ways, but the fundamental structural feature is the
classification of taxpayers into three basic income tax return filing
statuses: married,2 head of household,3 and unmarried. 4 A taxpayer's
filing status determines the applicable tax rate schedule 5 and standard7
deduction 6 and affects how credits and deductions phase in and out.
Although the aggregate tax benefit or penalty generated by one filing
status versus another depends on a complex set of circumstances, the
stakes of filing status can be significant at all income levels.8 The
1. In his classic monograph on the income tax, Henry Simons argued that expenditures on
children are consumption and should not affect income tax liability. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL
INCOME TAXATION 140 (1938); see also Lawrence Zelenak, Children and the Income Tax, 49 TAX L.
REV. 349, 359-61 (1994) ("Whatever may be said in theory for the view of children as consumption,
there is no political or popular support in the United States today for an income tax generally treating
children as just another consumption choice, irrelevant to the determination of tax liability."); Boris I.
Bittker, FederalIncome Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1448 (1975) ("No one but a
tax theorist, it might be asserted, could fail to see the difference [between supporting children and
maintaining a yacht].")
2. Married taxpayers generally may file either jointly or separately. See I.R.C. § 1(a) (2006)
(imposing tax rate schedule for married taxpayers filing jointly); id. § 1(d) (imposing tax rate schedule
for married taxpayers filing separately); id. § 6013 (providing requirements for the filing of a joint
return). Married taxpayers, however, generally will not save tax by filing separately except in unusual
circumstances. See Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 339 n. 1
(1994) (noting that separate returns can reduce the percentage floor on deductions determined by
reference to adjusted gross income, but that advantages may be more than offset by higher rates).
3. See I.R.C. § 1(b).
4. See I.R.C. § I(c). It is important to consider the treatment of both unmarried couples and
single individuals. See Lily Kahng, One is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return
World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 656-57 (2010) (coining the terms "unmarried couple's penalty,"
"unmarried couple's bonus," and "single person's penalty").
5. See I.R.C. § I(a)-(d) (imposing tax on married individuals filing jointly, heads of household,
unmarried individuals, and married individuals filing separately).
6. See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2).
7. See Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 22 (2000) (noting that marriage penalties from phaseouts can be "quite
significant").
8. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL

INCOME TAX xiv (1997). At low incomes, the standard deduction and Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) are most significant, while at high incomes the rate schedules and phaseout provisions are most
significant.
In addition to the income tax stakes, other important tax rules are affected by family
relationships. For example, gifts among married taxpayers are generally exempt from estate and gift tax.
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importance of filing status will increase with the sunset of the Bush tax
cuts, and if there are future rate hikes.9 In light of the historically high
federal budget deficit, there is speculation that rate increases' ° for
taxpayers of all income levels could be on the horizon. 11
This Article assesses whether the current filing system is defensible as
part of a progressive income tax system. In addition to considering the
work of tax scholars, this Article draws on the contemporary debate
among Congress, courts, family law scholars, and the public concerning
the meaning of marriage and whether it should be supported by the
government. The United States limits "marriage," for purposes of
See I.R.C. § 2523(a). Social security contributions are calculated on a separate basis for all taxpayers,
but social security benefits are calculated on a partially combined basis for married taxpayers. See
Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at BehavioralGender Biases in the Code,
40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 997 (1993).
9. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 341 ("The more progressive the rate structure, the more
significant the tax effects of joint returns. Effects that may have been tolerable under the low rates of
the 1986 Tax Reform Act may not be tolerable under the 36% and 39.6% tax rates introduced by the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993."). Our current rate structure is somewhat progressive but
relatively flat by historical standards. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A
CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 18-21 (4th ed. 2008) (summarizing the history of the
federal income tax system and charting top income tax rates). Rate cuts enacted under the Bush
Administration are currently scheduled to sunset at the end of 2010. Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901, 115 Stat. 38, 150 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ I); Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 103-105, 107, 117
Stat. 752, 754-56 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1); Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-311, §§ 101(b)-(e), 105, 118 Stat. 1166, 1167-69 (codified at I.R.C. § 1); see also Arthur
Laffer, Tax Hikes and the 2011 Economic Collapse,WALL ST. J., June 7, 2010, at A 19.
Although a complete discussion of nonincome taxes is beyond the scope of this Article,
recent Medicare tax increases include significant marriage bonuses and penalties. See Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 9015, 10,906 (2010) (amending I.R.C. § 3101(b));
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1402, 124 Stat. 1029,
1060-63 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 1411); Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Marriage Penalties Rise Under the
New HealthcareLaw, 127 TAX NOTES 349 (2010).
10. By "rate increase," I mean a rate increase through new legislation, not the scheduled sunsets.
11. See John D. McKinnon & Greg Hitt, Middle-Class Tax Boost Is Broached, WALL ST. J., June
23, 2010, at A2 ("When the time comes for a long-term plan, Mr. Hoyer added, 'raising revenue is part
of the deficit solution' along with spending cuts ...Republicans said Democrats were signaling their
intent to raise taxes on the middle class."); David Wessel, Taxing Rich Wouldn 't Close the Gap, but
Would Shrink It, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at A4 ("[N]either politicians nor their constituents show
any willingness to cut spending enough to avoid tax increases. So the issue is whose taxes, and the
arithmetic suggests it won't only be those who make more than S250,000 a year."); Bruce Bartlett,
Robin Hood Tax Policy, FORBES, July 17, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/16/tax-policy-wealthyopinions-columnists-bruce-bartlett.html ("Historically, increases in the top rate have tended to pave the
way for higher rates on the middle class. Holding down the top rate in effect places a cap on how high
tax rates on the middle class can go. If the top rate rises, higher rates on the middle class probably won't
be too far behind."); Ruth Marcus, Obama Squelches His Truth Whisperers, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2009,
at A13 (noting Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's and National Economic Council Director
Lawrence Summers's refusals to rule out tax increases on families making under $250,000); Deborah
Solomon, Woes Across the Ocean Spur U.S. to Choose Sides on Debt, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2010, at A2;
Fred Barnes, Pelosi'sLoss Could Be Obama's Gain, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2010, at A19.
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federal law, to unions between one man and one woman. 12 A growing
number of states, however, recognize same-sex marriages, civil unions,
and similar arrangements. 13 The controversy has centered on one of the
primary reasons why states and the federal government promote
marriage-to promote parenting. Another primary thread in the
literature has been the importance of individual autonomy.
Part II summarizes the history of United States federal income tax
filing statuses. Part III assesses the joint return against a potential
alternative of a single filing status, drawing on the work of tax scholars.
Part IV examines nontax literature on marriage and family. This Article
concludes that the joint return and special rates for married taxpayers
should be abolished but that a stronger case can be made for supporting
parenting through credits or the rate structure.
II.

HISTORY OF

TAX RETURN FILING IN THE UNITED STATES

The history of tax return filing in the United States has been told
many times; 14 however, a summary helps explain the dilemmas that
exist today. Tax scholarship traditionally has focused on the notion that
there are three principal goals in taxing single individuals, unmarried
couples, and married couples: progressivity, marriage neutrality, and
couples neutrality. 15 It is well known among tax scholars that it is
impossible to achieve all three of these features.
A. Individual Filing
The Revenue Act of 1913 allowed married couples to file jointly or
separately, but there was generally no advantage to filing jointly,
because the same rate schedule otherwise applicable to an individual
would apply to the couple. 16 In other words, married taxpayers filing
12. 1 U.S.C § 7 (2006).
13. See Matt Bai, Queer Developments, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2009, at MM 15 (noting that 13%
of Americans live in states with gay marriage); Philip Shishkin, Massachusetts Sues U.S. Over
Definition of Marriage,WALL ST. J., July 9, 2009, at A9; Philip Shishkin, Maine Becomes Fifth State to
Legalize Same-Sex Marriage,WALL ST. J., May 7, 2009, at A4; Susan Davis, U.S. Capital To Recognize
Gay Marriage,WALL ST. J., May 6, 2009, at A6; Jim DeMint, How Republicans Can Build a Big-Tent
Party, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2009, at A9 (opining that Republicans should "welcome a vigorous debate
about legalized abortion or same-sex marriage").
14. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1399-414; McCaffery, supra note 8, at 989-91; Zelenak, supra
note 7, at 4-8; Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and SeparateSpheres: Tax Law and GenderRoles in the
1940s, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 259 (1988).
15. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1396. "Couples neutrality" means that married couples with
equal combined incomes pay the same amount of tax.
16. Id. at 1400. Bittker notes, however, that in "unusual circumstances" aggregating income
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jointly would be allowed a single set of low-rate brackets, whereas two
full sets of low-rate brackets would apply if they filed separately. Under
this structure, a married couple with two equal income earners generally
paid a lower amount of tax than a married couple with the same income
earned by one spouse. In turn, a married couple with a single earner
paid approximately the same amount of tax as a single taxpayer with the
same income. 17 The individual filing system was essentially progressive
and marriage neutral but not couples neutral (i.e., married couples with
equal combined income sometimes paid different amounts of tax).
B. JointFiling

The income tax became more progressive in 1918, which rendered the
identity of the taxpayer to whom income was attributed even more
important, and led to attempts to shift income more evenly between
related taxpayers. 8 Some taxpayers agreed to shift income to a lowerincome spouse through income assignment contracts. 19
Married

taxpayers in community property states took the position that their
income should be split for federal income tax purposes because state

property20 law provided each spouse with a 50% interest in marital
income.
In 1930, the Supreme Court in Lucas v. Earl2 1 held that income

assignment contracts between spouses were ineffective for federal
might result in favorable treatment. Id. at 1400 n.20 (noting that combining income would increase the
ceiling for the deduction for charitable contributions, and that capital losses of one spouse could be
offset against capital gains of the other spouse on a joint return).
17. A married taxpayer living with a spouse, however, was allowed an additional $1,000
exemption beyond the generally applicable $3,000 exemption, but the $4,000 exemption could be
claimed only once or divided among the spouses. Revenue Act of 1913, § 2(C), 38 Stat. 114, 168;
Instructions to Form 1040 (1913), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/1913.pdf (last visited June 24, 2010).
Assuming the highest potential combined rate of 7%, Revenue Act of 1913, § 2(A)(2), 38 Stat. 114, 166,
a bonus exemption of $1,000 was worth as much as $70, or a $2,000 exemption penalty ($6,000 in total
exemptions for two individuals versus $4,000 for a married couple) was worth as much as $140. These
numbers may have been significant in 1913 dollars. On the other hand, the exemption amounts were so
high that only the wealthiest 0.5% of the population filed tax returns in 1914. SLEMROD & BAKIJA,
supra note 9, at 19. Overall, it seems reasonable to conceive of the early income tax as an
"individualistic" system. Cf Bittker, supra note 1, at 1400 (noting the "individualistic bias" of the early
tax statutes without discussing exemptions).
18. See Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 805, 808 (2008);
Zelenak, supra note 2, at 344-45.
19. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1400-01. There were other strategies to shift income, including
gifts of income producing property (often in trust) to a spouse. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 345.
Taxpayers also attempted to shift income by forming a partnership with a spouse. See Jones, supra note
14, at 274-93.
20. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1404-05.
21. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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income tax purposes. In a remarkable contrast later the same year, the
Court in Poe v. Seaborn22 held that state community property regimes
were effective to split income for federal income tax purposes, even if
the husband had the right to manage and control the community
property.
After Earl and Seaborn, the early income tax's individualistic filing
structure was no longer marriage neutral. Seaborn effectively allowed a
single-earner married couple in a community property state two full sets
of low-rate brackets.2 3 Earl prevented married couples in common law
states and unmarried couples from income splitting except through bona
fide transfers of income-producing property.
The federal tax advantages of community property led to several
common law states adopting community property over the succeeding
years until 1948.24 In 1941, the House Ways and Means Committee
recommended mandatory joint filing for married couples with the same
rate schedule applicable to an individual.2 5
The Senate Finance
Committee recommended a proposal to essentially reverse Seaborn's
allowance of income splitting to spouses in community property states.2 6
In 1948, Congress created a new filing status, married filing jointly,
with rate brackets twice those of an unmarried taxpayer. Congress's
stated rationale for joint filing was to equalize taxation among the states,
prevent the "impetuous" enactment of community property, and reduce
the incentive for tax avoidance devices. 27 Bittker suggested that absent
the joint return, nationwide adoption of community property would have
been inevitable, but enactment of the joint return allowed Congress to
take credit for a tax cut with the same cost. 28 Carolyn Jones has argued
that Congress intended to hinder the accession of women to economic
power. 29 In any event, the new structure provided a significant tax
benefit for single-earner married couples, achieving couples neutrality3 °
at the cost of marriage neutrality and progressivity.

22. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
23. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1408.
24. Id. at 1411-12.
25. Id. at 1408-9.
26. Id. at 1410-11.
27. Id. at 1413.
28. Id. at 1412-13.
29. See Jones, supra note 14, at 295-96.
30. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1413-14 n.73 (noting that separate filing rarely allowed a
married couple to achieve tax savings).
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C. Singles Penalty Relief and MarriagePenalization
Taxpayers began to conceive of the joint return as a tax benefit for
taxpayers with family support burdens rather than a method of
eliminating discrimination among property regimes. 3 1 In 1951, as a
response to complaints that the system was unfair to unmarried
taxpayers with dependents, Congress created the head of household
filing status. 32 Head of household status is available to an unmarried
taxpayer maintaining her home as the principal place of abode for a
child or certain other dependents. 33 The head of household rate
schedule has wider low-rate brackets than the rate schedule for an
unmarried taxpayer. Although overlooked by many commentators, a
dual-earner couple with a child could experience a marriage penalty as
early as 1951 due to the loss of head of household status.34
An unmarried taxpayer not eligible for head of household status could
still owe as much as 41% more tax than a married person with a stay-athome spouse.3 5 In 1969, Congress enacted a new rate schedule with
wider brackets for unmarried taxpayers to limit the perceived single
person's penalty to a 20% differential. 3 6 The widening of the unmarried
taxpayer brackets created the marriage penalty with which most are
familiar. Although filing status now is less important because tax rates
are lower, the current filing statuses and bonus-penalty structure is the
same as the 1969 system. Single-earner married couples have a bonus,
but on a pro rata basis, married taxpayers filing jointly are each subject
to a harsher rate schedule than unmarried taxpayers. Married taxpayers
filing separately are required to use a schedule that halves the bracket
cutoffs for married taxpayers filing jointly,37 so they cannot escape the
marriage penalty by filing separately.
In sum, the tax system's patchwork of marriage bonuses and penalties
is not the result of a carefully conceived plan. 3 8 The structure resulted
31. Seeid. at 1417.
32. Id.
33. I.R.C. § 2(b)(l) (2006).
34. See Zelenak, supra note 7, at 21-22. For illustrative purposes, consider the effect if high tax
rates begin for unmarried taxpayers at $100 of income, for married taxpayers filing jointly at $200, and
for heads of household at $150. In this simplified structure, an unmarried couple one of whom files as
head of household could have up to $250 of income taxed at a low rate; whereas if the same couple
married it could have no more than $200 taxed at a low rate.
35. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1429 n. 110.
36. Id.
37. I.R.C. § l(d) (2006).
38. Kahng, supra note 4, at 660 (noting that "the joint return was adopted not as a result of
reasoned tax policy analysis, but rather out of political expediency"); Zelenak, supra note 7, at 5 (calling
the joint return an "accident of history").
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from an unanticipated pair of Supreme Court decisions selectively
importing income splitting under state law into federal income tax law;
Congress's decision to equalize the taxation of married couples among
the states through a tax cut for single-earner married couples; and two
compromises to limit the unfairness of the system to unmarried
taxpayers. Reducing tax rates for married couples would decrease
equal-earner marriage penalties but also increase single-earner marriage
bonuses and single person's penalties. 39 In other words, in a joint return
world, "eliminate marriage penalties" means "create marriage
bonuses. 4 0

39. This Article focuses on the single-earner marriage bonus tied to the single person's penalty
and the equal-earner marriage penalty tied to the equal-earner unmarried couple's bonus. As Lily Kahng
has noted, the terms "marriage penalty" and "marriage bonus" obscure much complexity:
As commonly used, the terms "marriage bonus" or "marriage penalty" describe the
comparative tax burdens of two couples who are similarly situated except that one is
married and filing jointly, and the other is unmarried, with each person filing an
individual return. In some cases, the married couple will pay less than the unmarried
couple-a marriage bonus. In other cases, the married couple will pay more than the
unmarried couple-a marriage penalty.
In comparing the two couples, if the referent couple is the unmarried couple,
obviously the bonus and penalty will be reversed. The penalty and bonus from this
perspective are sometimes called the singles penalty and bonus. Of course, the two
people who comprise the unmarried couple are not single in the sense of being
uncoupled, but rather single in the sense of being unmarried. Their penalty or bonus, as
compared to the married couple, can more precisely be called the unmarried couple's
penalty or bonus.
A different meaning of the term "singles penalty" arises in considering the relative
tax burdens of married couples and uncoupled, single individuals. When an uncoupled,
single person pays more than a married couple with the same income, this is also called
the singles penalty. In addition, the reverse of this is called the marriage bonus. To be
more precise, and to avoid confusion with the newly named unmarried couple bonus or
penalty, it can be called the single person's penalty.
See Kahng, supra note 4, at 656-57 (footnotes omitted).
40. The principal sources of marriage bonuses and penalties for low-income taxpayers are the
standard deduction and EITC rather than the tax rate schedules. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note
8, at xvii. The Bush tax cuts increased the standard deduction for married taxpayers filing jointly to
double the standard deduction for an unmarried taxpayer; however, the doubling of the standard
deduction is scheduled to sunset at the end of 2010. Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-311, §§ 101(b), 105, 118 Stat. 1166, 1167-69 (codified at I.R.C. § 63); see also Laffer, supra
note 9. Moreover, even when the standard deduction for a joint return is double the unmarried taxpayer
standard deduction, there can still be a head of household standard deduction marriage penalty.
The EITC is a federal transfer program implemented through the tax system. See Jennifer
Bird-Pollan, Who's Afraid of Redistribution?An Analysis of the EarnedIncome Tax Credit, 74 MO. L.
REV. 251, 284-85 (2009); Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of TaxBased Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REv. 533, 534 (1995). After an income plateau, the EITC phases
out as income increases, but the complete phaseout amount only increases slightly in the case of a joint
return. See I.R.C. § 32(b)(2)(B) (2006). Because the EITC schedule depends on how many qualifying
children a taxpayer has, there can be a marriage bonus if one partner can trigger a more favorable
schedule by adding children to a joint return without adding much income.
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III. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT FILING STATUSES
A. Progressivity
It is easy to take for granted the idea that joint filing is incompatible
with a strong commitment to progressivity without explicitly
acknowledging the difficulty of identifying the reasons for the
progressive rate structure. In fact, there is no generally accepted
justification for progressivity, and without a rationale for progressivity,
it is impossible to know whether joint filing actually offends the
principle.
In their classic article on progressivity, Blum and Kalven described
the case for progressivity as "stubborn but uneasy," concluding that it is
"hard to gain much comfort from the special arguments, however
intricate their formulations, constructed on notions of benefit, sacrifice,
Blum and Kalven argued that
ability to pay, or economic stability.'
the strongest justification was simply redistribution of wealth.42
Michael Livingston has said that "[n]ow as always, the case for
progressivity rises and falls with the redistributive argument":
The alternate arguments-diminishing marginal utility of money, the
benefit theory and the breakup of large concentrations of wealth-were
dubious even in Blum and Kalven's day, and intermediate developments
have if anything weakened these further. Marginal utility, always
indeterminate in nature, becomes still more so in a wealthier society,
where the differences in consumption patterns tend to be of degree rather
than kind. This problem may be sidestepped by focusing solely on
extreme cases of wealth and poverty, but at that point becomes essentially
a restatement of the case for redistribution, with relatively little added by
the utility concept. The benefit theory founders on the lack of any
obvious correlation between taxes and benefits, and if extended to its
ultimate logic would produce a regime of user fees rather than a
progressive income tax. Concentrations of wealth, if we are seriously
concerned about them, are better dealt with by a wealth 43or inheritance tax.
There is no escaping the redistributive or fairness issue.
Although redistributive goals more defensibly account for
progressivity, redistribution of wealth holds far less popular appeal than

41. See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U.
CHI. L. REV. 417, 519-20 (1952).
42. See id.
43. Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kalven at 50: Progressive Taxation, "Globalization," and
the New Millennium, 4 FLA. TAX REv. 731, 745-46 (2000).
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alternative explanations.4 4

Redistributive arguments are dominated by Rawlsian concerns.45
Rawls argued that the distribution of income and wealth is due, in part,
to luck, talent, and social circumstances which are morally arbitrary.4 a
Rawls suggested that too much inequality could jeopardize equality of
opportunity and render representative government a sham.47 Rawls
concluded that society should take steps-precisely how far is uncleartoward making the distribution of wealth more equal.
If the rationale for progressive taxation is to correct injustice in pretax income, then the individual should be the taxable unit. Whether a

taxpayer has a spouse, partner, children, and so forth should not negate
concerns that the taxpayer's income was due to luck, talent, and social
circumstances. Indeed, Lily Kahng has argued that there is "credible
evidence that married men receive higher pay than single men merely
because they are married, and not because they are more productive. 48
In keeping with the notion of progressivity as redistribution, the tax

system generally ignores gifts in determining donors' and donees'
incomes. 49 Moreover, except between spouses, 50 large gifts are subject
44. Id. at 738.
45. See David Elkins, Responding to Rawls: Toward a Consistent and Supportable Theory of
Distributive Justice, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 267, 267 (2007).
46. See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 72 (1971).

47. Id. at 278.
48. See Kahng, supranote 4, at 668-70.
49. Shari Motro tells a whimsical but powerful example illustrating the marriage bonus, which in
some sense is an exception to the general rule ignoring gifts in calculating income:
Think, for example, of three young investment bankers-Meg, Malik, and Seymour
Each makes $100,000 per year, of which they each owe approximately $20,000 in taxes.
Meg and Malik fall in love, move in together, and decide to get married. Shortly after the
wedding, Meg leaves her job to fulfill a lifelong dream: becoming a trapeze artist.
Malik's $100,000 supports both himself and Meg, who now has no income. Despite the
money they are saving by splitting the rent, their lifestyle is not what it used to be. Still,
Meg is delighted and when Meg is happy, Malik is too.

Seymour, who has always

dreamed of trying his hand at painting, is still hard at work with Malik. Though he is
jealous of Meg and wishes it was he who had found love and a sugar daddy, he keeps his
resentment to himself. But come tax time, he loses his cool. It turns out that filing jointly
with Meg, Malik now owes some $6,000 less than Seymour on the same $100,000 of
income. Essentially, the government is subsidizing Meg's new hobby. Put another way,
the government has handed Malik $6,000 (in form of a tax break) for no other reason
than being married to someone who has opted out of the workforce. Malik's choice to
marry, and the pleasure he derives from making it possible for Meg to do the double
somersault, are personal consumption choices that, the argument goes, should have no
effect on his tax liability.
See Shari Motro, A New "I Do ": Towards a Marriage-NeutralIncome Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509,
1524-25 (2006) (citations omitted) (the illustration uses 2006 tax rates and assumes the standard
deduction).
50. See Bridget J. Crawford, One Flesh, Two Taxpayers: A New Approach to Marriage and
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to the unified estate and gift tax, which can be conceived of as
increasing the progressivity of the income tax.5 ' In contrast, spouses
with unequal incomes are effectively treated as if they made gifts
deductible to the donor-spouse and includible to the donee-spouse, with
the effect of income equalization.5 2
It has been argued that joint filing is logical because married couples
pool income and make spending decisions equally for the group's joint
benefit.
It is unclear to what extent married couples pool income,
however, and it seems likely that a primary earner will have leverage
over consumption decisions.54 Shari Motro, in contrast, has proposed
allowing income splitting only where there is a binding agreement to
share resources equally and regardless of whether two taxpayers are
married.5 5
Motro argues that a separate filing system implicitly
commoditizes the contributions of the partners, which conflicts with
deeply held attitudes that marriage should be a partnership of equals
involving "cooperation and unity.", 56 If the individual is the unit,
however, embracing sharing as a basis for income splitting retreats from
first principles about redistribution. The system would be allowing
individual taxpayers-rather than the government-to choose, in part,
the transfer recipients of a tax-and-transfer scheme.
Although any unintended increase in the commoditization of personal
relationships would be an important potential trade-off, the application
of this problem outside the family business context seems limited. In
the context of a family business, putting a precise value on each person's
contribution could be difficult and psychologically burdensome,5 7 and is
currently unnecessary for husbands and wives filing jointly. On the
other hand, most taxpayers are employees of unrelated third parties, and
Wealth Transfer Taxation, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 757, 764-75 (2004) (describing estate and gifttax transition

from no marital deduction, to 50% marital deduction, and finally the current unlimited (subject to certain
restrictions) marital deduction).
51.

See Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 271-73

(1983).
52. See Motro, supra note 49, at 1516-18.
53. In contrast, some have argued that a partnership model explains marital income splitting
under traditional tax principles. See id. at 1526-27 (critiquing the "collective efforts" justification).
Under the model, the spouses agree to a 50-50 partnership because of their equal contributions to the
production of marital income. It is, of course, possible for married couples to form a partnership and
make contributions of equal value, but it is unrealistic to generally presume equal contributions. See id.
at 1527 (suggesting disguised gifts
or payment for personal services rather than business efforts is more
likely).
54. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the
Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 105 (1993).

55. See Motro, supra note 49, at 1543-44.
56. See id. at 1536-40.
57. See id. at 1537.
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would not need to make such an allocation. Although non-market
exchanges between married and unmarried couples perhaps theoretically
should be treated as realization events, this does not seem administrable,
generally is not pursued now, and likely would not be stepped up under
separate filing. 5 For these reasons, I question whether separate filing
would intolerably increase the commoditization of marriages and other
relationships in a way that changes social norms or imposes widespread
cognitive dissonance in the return preparation process. 5
Could marriage penalties be justified based on household economies
of scale? 60 In general, a married couple spends less per person on living
expenses than two single people; therefore, perhaps the couple has a
greater ability to pay tax than two single people. 61 But the comparison
between a married couple living together and two single people living
alone is outdated. Similar economies of scale should apply to
62
cohabitating couples, but the penalties will be absent in that case.
Moreover, two single people could achieve roughly similar economies
of scale by sharing a bedroom (with separate beds) or converting a
shared living area to sleep space; indeed, anecdotes suggest that this
often occurs in high cost of living areas. One might respond that
married taxpayers or couples would be happier economizing in this
manner than single people. Sometimes this will be true, to be sure, but
happiness is ignored elsewhere for tax purposes. It also seems odd to
punish sharing. If we are serious about the economies of scale
justification, and are concerned about exacting more revenue from
people who could economize, why not tax everyone at the same
(relatively high) rate and challenge them to save?
One might defend the marriage bonus as an allowance for the fact that
a married sole earner must support more than one person, whereas a
single person supports only one person. 63 Similar to the economies of
scale justification, this fails to take into account unmarried single-earner
couples. Moreover, a basic support burden seems too modest to explain
joint filing.
It seems more appropriate to take into account
58. Cf id. at 1538 (observing that disregarding transfers even between non-spouses is the "de
facto situation" for unmarried couples who pool and that the IRS "usually turns a blind eye to these
arrangements, rarely requiring the low-earning partner who assumes more responsibility for household
chores to report as compensation income received from the primary wage-eamer").
59. In addition, commodization for tax purposes may not even send a message that relationships
should be commoditized for non-tax purposes.
60. See Bittker, supra note 1,at 1422-1425 (critiquing this justification).
61. Although some married couples must live apart for business reasons, it seems reasonable to
assume that married couples will share living space and other assets.
62. Id. at 1423.
63. See Motro, supra note 49, at 1525 (rejecting this justification).
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considerations such as economies of scale, pooling, and support burdens
in the transfer portion of a tax-and-transfer system. If the goal is to
offset a specific support burden, a dependency credit would be more
defensible than joint filing. 64
B. Secondary EarnerBias

Although today almost 40% of married women are primary earners,
and over 60% of married women earn at least 25% of their family's
income, approximately 30% of married women are not employed.65
Joint filing impacts a homemaker's decision to seek paid labor outside
the home, because the secondary earner's income may be perceived of
as "stacked" on top of the primary earner's income and subjected to
66
relatively high marginal rates beginning with the first dollar of income.
Another distortion affecting secondary workers' labor decisions
relates to child care costs. Subject to a modest child care credit,
taxpayers must pay tax on earnings spent on child care, but childcare
provided by a homemaker is not subject to tax as imputed income.
Although the same unfair dichotomy could exist under separate filing,
the stacking effect in a joint filing system exacerbates the disincentive to
seek paid labor and pay for child care.
C. Neutrality Among State MaritalPropertyRegimes

Perhaps we should not view the marital taxable unit as having much
to do with equity among taxpayers. Congress enacted the joint return to
eliminate discrimination among state marital property regimes. One
might ask whether this is, rather than a traditional tax equity analysis,
more of an argument for deference
to the states in a matter arguably at
67
the core of state sovereignty.
As it happens, federal tax law flies in the face of state sovereignty,
even in matters arguably at the core of traditional state functions. The
federal government's decision to ignore same-sex marriages and similar
arrangements that are recognized under state law is an important
example. In addition, although the power to tax has traditionally been
64. Id.
65. See Heather Boushey, The New Breadwinners, in THE SHRIVER REPORT,
http://www.awomansnation.comeconomy.php (last visited June 19, 2010).
66. See McCaffery, supra, note 8, at 1059; Zelenak, supra note 2, at 365. The stacking effect
operates even in a system with double-wide brackets, as long as one spouse's earnings are viewed as
optional.
67. Cf Motro, supra note 49, at 1554-55 (noting concerns about states' sovereignty over family
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considered a fundamental state power, the federal income tax
discriminates in favor of states with income taxes rather than sales taxes,
by allowing taxpayers a personal deduction for state income taxes but
not sales taxes. 68
Even conceding the attractiveness of a hands-off approach to state
marital property law, an income splitting mandate is not the only way to
achieve neutrality among the different marital property systems.
Congress could also achieve uniformity for federal tax purposes by
which would
treating community property rights as income assignments,
69
be ineffective for federal income tax purposes.
D. Preventing Tax Abuse
One might object that separate filing will lead to tax evasion as in the
pre-1948 era. There are three primary difficulties: allocating earned
income, allocating income from property, and allocating deductions.7 °
One device taxpayers have used to shift business income is family
partnerships. As an example, one spouse who contributes nothing or
services of little market value could receive a partnership interest for the
purpose of splitting business income. The IRS, however, has enjoyed a
good deal of success in challenging abusive partnerships. 71 On the other
hand, if a family partnership is legitimate, and to the extent that both
spouses provide valuable services, there should be no objection to
income splitting. Of course, most taxpayers simply have wage income
from an 72unrelated employer, which would be difficult to shelter in this
manner.
Assuming the inviolability of the unlimited marital gift tax deduction,
income from property could be split evenly by transferring ownership of
income-producing property to a lower-income spouse. Tracing the
income to the spouse who originally owned the property would be
unrealistic. 73 Without tracing gifts, there are three basic choices: tax the
owner with no special anti-abuse rule, tax the owner but at the higher of
68. I.R.C. § 164(a) (2006).
69. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning MaritalStatus as a Factor
in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1, 55-58 (1980) (concluding potential constitutional
challenges would likely fail).
70. See Zelenak, supranote 2, at 382-94.
71. See id. at 383 ("not a major problem"); Jones, supra note 14, at 274-79 (discussing history of
family partnership litigation).
72. Cf. id. at 382 ("In the vast majority of cases there is no question as to which spouse earned a
particular item of income, so taxation to the earner will involve neither complexity nor opportunity for
abuse.")
73. See id. at 387.
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the spouse's rates, or something in between. 74
I would recommend using the higher rate of the two spouses, even
though this would create a marriage penalty for a relatively small
number of couples. 75 Of course, much income from property is longterm capital gain, which is not subject to progressive rates, so that the
identity of the taxpayer generally does not affect the tax rates. The issue
primarily involves short-term capital gain, interest, rent, and royalty
income of wealthy couples, where one person has earned income or
income from property below the low-bracket thresholds. In this limited
context, a marriage penalty seems tolerable to prevent manipulation of
the income tax. Effectively putting income from property into a separate
basket could also reduce potential secondary earner work disincentives,
because the secondary earner's income would not be stacked on top of
income from property.76

Business deductions should be allocated to the earner in a separate
filing system, but it is challenging to conceive of a coherent rule for
personal deductions. Personal deductions, which generally channel tax
relief for consumption expenditures disproportionately to high-income
taxpayers, seem inconsistent with a theory of progressivity as
redistribution of unjust pre-tax income. Means-tested refundable credits
seem more consistent with redistributive goals. Thus, perhaps any
allocation for personal deductions will appear incoherent in combination
with the progressivity rationale for separate filing.
A marriage-neutral rule would allocate deductions to the spouse who
is liable for an expense, but this might result in lost deductions. 77 The
marriage-neutral rule could, in some circumstances, discourage home
ownership by a lower-income spouse, because the value of the mortgage
interest deduction would be higher with a higher-income spouse.78 The
opposite approach would be to allow spouses to use deductions pursuant
to a formula-one possibility would be to allow the most taxpayerfavorable use of the deduction.79
Lawrence Zelenak suggests the use of a formula allocating deductions
74. Cf id. at 384 (describing five options, which I collapse into three).
75. Cfid. at 391 (acknowledging that this option does not put a premium on tax planning, is
administrable, does not burden secondary workers, and is marriage-neutral for most couples) ("I give
more importance to the first option's strengths, but that conclusion is certainly debatable."). But see id.
at 390 (concluding that, in general, respecting transfers of property for purposes of income tax rates on
income from property is preferable because it "achieves true marriage neutrality" even though it puts a
"heavy premium on careful tax planning" and carries a "significant" secondary worker disincentive).
76. See id. at 388.
77. See id. at 391-92.
78. See id. at 392-93.
79. See id. at 392.
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in proportion to income, or a taxpayer favorable formula. 80 Zelenak
argues that this method would not discourage homeownership by lower81
income spouses and would not put a premium on tax planning.
Zelenak observes that it is "not the duty of the federal income tax to
encourage transfers of property to non-earning spouses," but it should at
least not actively discourage such transfers. 82 I tend to agree with these
observations, but am concerned that it is unfair to taxpayers who are not
married. Ownership neutrality and tax simplicity should be applied to
them as well, but some line drawing would be necessary to prohibit, for
example, the sale of mortgage interest deductions to any unrelated
person.

IV. NONTAX PERSPECTIVES

ON THE FAMILY

In my view, tax scholarship would benefit by incorporating
perspectives borrowed from legal scholars and judges who focus on
substantive family law issues when addressing how best to address
contemporary families. If we are going to think seriously about possible
public policy justifications for how we treat married taxpayers vis-a-vis
unmarried taxpayers, even to the extent of undercutting the commitment
to a progressive system of taxation, we should make sure we understand
the contemporary debate about marriage in family law circles.
Although tax law scholarship obviously contributes greatly to our
understanding of taxation, it is easy to neglect other disciplines. As
Michael Livingston has noted, traditional tax scholarship tends to focus
on law and economics methodology.83 As Livingston explains:
The principal themes of tax scholarship-fairness, efficiency, and the
search for a comprehensive tax base-are essentially economic in nature,
so that even "traditional" tax scholarship has something of a law-andeconomics flavor. The question of audience has been resolved largely by
default: authors simply assume that there is an audience of judges,
Treasury and IRS personnel, enlightened legislators, and (especially)
other tax scholars that is interested
in good tax policy. Tax scholarship is
84
presumably written for them.

80. Id. at 393.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of
the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 365 (1998). Livingston posits that this is because much tax
scholarship is aimed at Congress, the Treasury Department, and the Internal Revenue Service, rather
than at other legal academics or judges serving on nontax courts. See id. at 367-68, 373-74, 389-90.
84. Id. at 374.
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Thus, for better or worse, tax scholars have sometimes eschewed
engaging with scholars working in other substantive fields, even if there
are obvious points of tangent (such as administrative law). 85 Often, the
claim that "tax is different" leads tax scholars to reject importing
concepts from other areas of law, even including such fundamental
86
questions as whether Chevron deference applies to tax regulations.

Although tax law and scholarship is different, and historically has
been directed at a more targeted audience, this does not mean that tax
policy analysis cannot or will not benefit from the insights of legal
scholars and courts working on a common problem. In thinking about
the tax treatment of marriage, family law perspectives could be useful in

ferreting out precisely why marriage retains such cultural salience in
contemporary American society; if we seek a plausible rationale for
treating marriage as a basis for favorable tax treatment, we should not
disregard the perspectives of those scholars most immersed in thinking
about marriage as a social and legal institution.
Just as judges can benefit from considering foreign law and from

sustained interactions with jurists from other nations, tax scholars could
benefit from more sustained engagement with scholars working in other
areas of law. 87 As Ronald Krotoszynski has asked, "If a judge can find
inspiration in a monograph or law review article, why should she refrain
from finding such inspiration in a foreign legal text (even if imperfectly
understood)?" 88 In a similar vein, tax scholars might find it useful to
85. See Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury's (Lack o)
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1153, 1155-56 (2008) (noting that "[o]ver time, however, benign neglect and a restructuring of Internal
Revenue Service ('IRS') personnel and priorities have yielded contemporary drafters of tax regulations
with little knowledge of or regard for administrative law requirements" and observing that
"[clorrespondingly, other tax scholars have observed the tax bar's insular nature and resulting tendency
to disregard potentially relevant nontax legal doctrine").
Of course, obvious and important
counterexamples exist. For example, Dorothy Brown writes about tax from a critical race perspective.
See Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469 (1997). Similarly, Maureen Cavanaugh wrote about contemporary tax
policy from the vantage point of a scholar in classics. See, e.g., Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Democracy,
Equality and Taxes, 54 ALA. L. REV. 415 (2003); Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Order in Multiplicity:
Aristotle on Text, Context, and the Rule of Law, 79 N.C. L. REV. 577 (2001).
86. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1540 (2006) ("Where tax scholars and practitioners addressing the
issue of tax deference are fairly consistent is in their insistence that when it comes to Chevron, tax is
special and should be treated differently from other areas of administrative law.").
87. See, e.g., JUDGES tN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY: AN INTERNATIONAL CONVERSATION

(Robert Badinter & Stephen Breyer, eds. 2004).
88. Ronald J.Krotoszynski, Jr., "I'd Like to Teach the World to Sing (in Perfect Harmony)
International Judicial Dialogue and the Muses-Reflections on the Perils and the Promise of
InternationalJudicialDialogue, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1321, 1357 (2006). He cautions, however, against
the overuse of foreign law in interpreting domestic legal instruments: "At the same time, however,
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consider the marriage debate from the perspective of family scholars to
better understand the role and purpose of marriage in the contemporary
United States.
A. The Benefits of Marriage
1. Private Benefits
Although the line between private and public benefits is murky,
89
because private benefits can also incidentally benefit the public,
certain benefits of marriage arguably primarily benefit the couple rather
than provide a social good.
Linda Waite and Maggie Gallagher have argued that marriage has a
transformational effect on couples. 90 Studies consistently show that
married couples are happier, healthier, and wealthier than unmarried
couples or singles. 91 But Anita Bernstein has reminded us that however
strong the correlation, correlation does not equal causation. 92 As
discussed below, scholars such as Robin Wilson have made an
intuitively persuasive case as to how marriage promotes optimal
outcomes for children, 93 but it is unclear by what mechanism marriage
transforms couples in other respects. Another potential explanation is
that because marriage is a desirable status, the most successful people
seek out the symbol, and are better able to maintain the relationship; in
other words, single people are single because they are relatively poor,
unhealthy, or otherwise undesirable, rather than the
socially awkward,
94
converse.
Recognizing the autonomy interests of adults is a primary value in
Courts examining the
contemporary marriage discourse.95
judges should take care not to mistake a muse for more than what it is-an ephemeral source of
motivation and inspiration." Id. at 1358.
89. See, e.g., Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 517 (2009) (questioning an
expansive reading of public use requirement under the Takings Clause).
90. See LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED
PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETIrER OFF FINANCIALLY 18-35 (2000).
91. See Anita Bemstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REv. 129, 159
(2003); see also Kahng, supra note 4, at 667-72 (discussing potential wage premium for married men,
and describing stigmatization of single people).
92. See Bernstein, supra note 91, at 159.
93. See infra notes 104 through 110 and accompanying text.
94. See Bernstein, supra note 91, at 159-60.
95. See Lynne Wardle, "Multiply and Replenish ": Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of
State Interests in Marital Procreation,24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 771, 778 (2001) ("Contemporary
legal literature contains surprisingly little serious scholarship discussing the social interests underlying
laws regulating marriage. Perhaps this is because the overwhelming trend of developments in American
family law during the past thirty years has emphasized the autonomous individual's interest in family
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constitutionality of restrictions on the right to marry have indicated that
to one another
people have an interest in expressing their commitment
96
commitment.
a
such
recognize
state
the
having
and in
2. Public Benefits
An exhaustive list of the public benefits of marriage is impossible, but
the promotion of procreation and child rearing always appears
prominently on the list. Aside from preserving the species, reproduction
fuels economic growth. 97 At the same time, we generally let the costs of
reproduction rest on parents, even though raising a child is expensive.
Estimates of spending per child range from approximately $7,800 per
child per year for low-income families to approximately $17,500 per
child per year for families with the highest incomes. 98 As a result of the
investments, both in cash and time, that parents make in their children,
new adults eventually serve in the workforce; dwindling population, in
contrast, will shrink the economy and increase the per capita burden of
caring for the elderly. 99 The potential economic doomsday scenario
involves the government issuing debt, raising taxes, inflating currency,
and raising interest rates. 100
Indeed, because national birthrates have fallen even below the
replacement level for the current population, several Western European
nations, including, for example, Sweden and Italy, have adopted "baby
stipends" paid directly to mothers as a financial incentive for pregnancy
and childbirth.' 0 ' Plunging birthrates present serious and broad based
relations.").
96. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978) (freedom to marry even if
delinquent on child support); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009) (option to choose
opposite-sex partner is irrelevant to homosexuals); Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of
Marriage,Kinship, and Sexual Privacy; Balancingthe Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv.

463, 468 (1983) ("[C]ontemporary legal writers take for granted that the 'ight to marry' is grounded 'in
respect for freedom of choice in intimate personal relationships ...').
97. See PHILLIP LONGMAN, EMPTY CRADLE: How FALLING BIRTHRATES THREATEN WORLD

PROSPERITY AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 4 (2004).
98. See MARK LINO, CTR. FOR NUTRITION POL'Y & PROMOTION, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN BY FAMILIES, 2007, at ii-iv (2008).

99. See Stephanie Hoffer, Adopting the Family Taxable Unit, 76 U. CIN. L. REv. 55, 61 (2007).
100. Id.

101. Stephen Graham, Bundles of both joy and cash; Germany begins offering new financial
bonuses to raise its sagging birthrate, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 4, 2007, at All (noting newly adopted

German baby bonus program and describing existing baby bonus programs in Britain, Russia, Spain,
France, the Netherlands, and Italy). Sweden pioneered this kind of program in 1948 and recently
enhanced the incentives to encourage more births:
Since 1948, Sweden has made a monthly cash payment for each child under 16. The
child allowance now starts at $155. In 2001, the government increased the allowance for
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social problems in societies that look to new workers and consumers to
serve as an engine for economic growth and to fund retirement programs
for older persons. In Germany, for example, "[a] government study
forecast, that Germany's population will drop by as much as 16 percent
02
by 2050, from the current 82.4 million to as little as 69 million.",
Needless to say, a population 0 decline
of this magnitude would have
3
1
effects.
negative
wide-ranging,
Robin Wilson has written that optimal child rearing is a primary
reason for continued state support of marriage. 1 4 Conversely, if
marriage does not advance child rearing, it might be seen as an
unreasonably "moralistic" position. 10 5 Wilson argues that there is
empirical evidence for a causal link between marriage and optimal child
rearing. 106 There are several intuitive explanations for this relationship.
Because a married couple expects a more permanent relationship, the
parties may try to avoid "sharp bargaining or tit-for-tat reciprocity,
spiking each other for every perceived fault."' 0 7 Unmarried couples are
more likely to demand a perfectly equal division of power in the
relationship, which can lead to increased monitoring, friction, and
"harden the interactions between the adults." 10 8 Children may be
harmed by exposure to these types of behavior. 109 Marriage may carry
with it social norms of greater involvement with the children for males
and better parenting for either parent. 10
Although Wilson apparently reserves on whether state support of
marriage might plausibly be justified for other reasons, Maggie
Gallagher is more forthcoming. Gallagher rejects the transformational
potential of marriage as a rationale for state involvement, inasmuch as it
is for the private benefit of the parties. 1llGallagher's thesis appears to
be that there must be a primary public benefit to justify state
large families-parents with three children, for instance, receive $530 per month, and
those with four get $811. Parents also get acombined 480 days of paid leave per child.
Id.
102. Id.

103. See id.(noting that a substantial decline in Germany's population "could hurt the economy
by sapping the work force-and undermine the state pension system").
104. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Evaluating Marriage:Does MarriageMatter to the Nurturing of
Children?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 847, 849 (2005).

105. Id. at 850.
106. Id. at 879.
107. Id. at 873.

108. Id. at 874.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 875.
Ill. See Maggie Gallagher, What is Marriage For? The Public Purposes of Marriage Law, 62

LA. L. REv. 773, 775, 779 (2002).
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involvement in marriage. 1 12 In Gallagher's view, the "public legal
union of a man and a woman is designed first and foremost to protect the
children that their sexual union (and that type of sexual union alone)
regularly produces."' 1 3 Gallagher cautions that the potential extinction
of the species is "not as academic as many perhaps think."'14
Moreover, the view that state involvement in marriage is really a
proxy for promoting procreation and child rearing-and only of the
optimal sort, viewed through a traditional lens-resonates outside the
ivory tower. In 1996, the Defense of Marriage Act defined marriage for
federal purposes as opposite-sex only, and permitted states not to
The
recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states. 15
legislative history clearly shows the primacy of child rearing in
Congress's decision:
Simply defined, marriage is a relationship within which the community
socially approves and encourages sexual intercourse and the birth of
children. It is society's way of signaling to would-be parents that their
long-term relationship is socially important a public concern, not simply a
private affair.... That, then, is why we have marriage laws. Were it not
for the possibility of begetting children inherent in heterosexual unions,
society would have no particular interest in encouraging citizens to come
together in a committed relationship. But because America, like nearly
every known human society, is concerned about its children, our
to ensure that we preserve and
government has a special obligation
116
protect the institution of marriage.
Congress apparently believed that in the absence of a link between
marriage and procreation, "society would have no particular interest" in
although not particularly
recognizing marriage. "7 This is a powerful,
8
cogent, endorsement of the linkage."
112. Id. at 779, 781.
113. Id. at 782.
114. Id. at 789 ("For two generations every Western, industrialized nation has had subreplacement birth rates. Here in America, the crisis is still many generations off, as our birthrates are
closer to replacement and our social tolerance of immigration higher. But many European nations are,
absent dramatic changes in reproductive patterns, on the road to dying out.")
115. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
116. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 14(1996).
117. Id.
118. Of course, unmarried people have and raise children, and these children also represent a
social value. Indeed, the state is probably powerless constitutionally to attempt to limit procreation to
married couples. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 933 (1992) (plurality
opinion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); but
see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927). Although the Supreme Court has never formally
overruled Buck, subsequent opinions suggest that it no longer possesses doctrinal force, see, e.g., San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 100-01 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Roe and Skinner effectively establish a right to procreate, the precedent in Buck notwithstanding),
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The traditional view of marriage has been challenged in state courts
around the country and in federal court. Regardless of whether they
hold for or against same-sex marriage or other unions (e.g., "civil
unions" with the benefits of marriage), courts generally have noted that
procreation and child-rearing are the touchstone of state support of
marriage. Courts that hold in favor of same-sex unions generally focus
on the lack of evidence that same-sex couples cannot be good parents
and the fact that opposite-sex marriage appears over-inclusive to the
extent that it is not conditioned on procreation or ability to procreate." '9
Courts that uphold same-sex marriage bans generally do so under the
most lenient standard of review, focusing on the theoretical plausibility
that opposite-sex parenting might be optimal and rational to
subsidize. 120
Most Americans support same-sex civil unions with virtually all the
privileges and obligations of marriage. 121 Still, the nomenclature is
important: most Americans do not support the extension of "marriage"
rights to same-sex couples.' 22 Although national figures undoubtedly
smooth out a great deal of local variation, positive attitudes toward equal
benefits for same-sex unions suggest a rethinking of marital norms. One
possibility is there is a contemporary norm in favor of child rearing,
regardless of how the child is produced or whether the custodial parents
are male and female. Another possibility is that society regrets that
opposite-sex marriage is not conditioned on satisfaction of the
traditional purposes of marriage; now that the gate is irreversibly open

as a practical matter, perhaps people think it would be unfair to exclude
same-sex couples. The most likely explanation, however is that popular
and legal scholars also have argued that Buck no longer constitutes good law, relying in part on lower
federal and state court decisions so holding. See Russell D. Covey, Criminal Madness: Cultural
Iconography and Insanity, 61 STAN. L. REv. 1375, 1398 (2009) ("In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court
essentially repudiated Buck v. Bell's embrace of eugenic criminology, ruling that Oklahoma's Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act was unconstitutional, at least as applied to Skinner, who had been convicted
of stealing chickens."); William A. Krais, Note & Comment, The Incompetent Developmentally
Disabled Person's Right of Self-Determination: Right-to-Die, Sterilization and Institutionalization,15
AM. J.L. & MED. 333, 352 n.100 (1989) ("Since Skinner, involuntary sterilization statutes have been
considered unconstitutional absent a showing that such a statute 'is the only remedy available to further
a compelling governmental interest."' (quoting In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 368-69 (Colo. 1981)).
119. See, e.g., Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 899-902 (Iowa 2009); Lewis v. Harris, 908
A.2d 196, 216-17 (N.J. 2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 882 (Vt. 1999).
120. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7, 11-12 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King
County, 138 P.3d 963, 982-83 (Wash. 2006).
121. See Frank Rich, The Bigots' Last Hurrah, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009, at WKIO; Adam
Nagourney, As Giuliani Strays From G.O.P. Base, He Sticks to 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2007, at
A22; Peter Steinfels, The combat ofAmerica's 'culture wars' takes place within politicalparties instead
of between them, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2006, at All.
122. See supra note 121.
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opinion simply favors individual autonomy.' 23 Whatever the precise
explanation, Americans have collectively moved away from a rigid
norm of privileging optimal (again, through the traditional lens) child
rearing.
B. Criticismsof MarriageSubsidies
Who will not benefit if we persist in subsidizing only nuclear
families? The nuclear family has been vanishing. There are more single
adults than married adults.' 24 Today, most children have lived with125a
single parent or with a parent and that parent's unmarried partner.
Moreover, the unmarried families with children are relatively poor. 126
to simply heap benefit on
Arguably, subsidizing married families "seems
127
those who are already the most advantaged."'
Even the defenders of marriage point out the potential pitfalls of
subsidies. Robin Wilson has argued that the potential for too much
success is more dangerous than the potential for failure. 12 8 Subsidies
"may well induce marginally-committed couples to marry, seeding the
chances for continuing marital dissolution and weakening norms of
fidelity, selflessness and commitment associated with marriage."'129 It is
unclear precisely how to thread the needle between appropriate support
of marriage and degrading it with subsidy. Kimberly Yuracko has
suggested it would be better to focus on norms rather than marriage:
"[R]ather than using marriage as the mediator by which to support
positive parental norms, it might be more wise, effective, and fair to
simply bolster the norms of parental commitment and responsibility
30
directly, and for all parents, regardless of individuals' marital status."'
In sum, most courts, legislators, and legal scholars consistently link
the privileging of marriage to that institution's strong historical link to
procreation and raising children. If this link reliably existed, it would
provide a normatively persuasive rationale for some form of subsidy,
123. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The Future of Marriage in
the Law, 49 LOY. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (2003) (critiquing the evolution of autonomy as the modem driving
force behind marriage).
124. See Sam Roberts, It's Official: To Be MarriedMeans To Be Outnumbered, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 2006, at A22.
125. See Leah Ward Sears, The "MarriageGap ": A Casefor Strengthening Marriagein the 21st
Century, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1243, 1246 (2007).
126. See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Does Marriage Make People Good or Do Good People Marry?,
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 889, 894 (2005).
127. Id.
128. See Wilson, supra note 104, at 878.
129. Id.
130. See Yuracko, supra note 126, at 893.
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including a tax subsidy, for marriage as a proxy for the creation and
rearing of children. The problem, however, is that that our tax policies
no longer reflect contemporary social realities. And, because of the
constitutionally protected status of personal decisions about birth
control, 13 1 abortion, 132 and procreation, 133 the government could not
restrict parenting to married couples even if it wished to. Moreover, it is

possible to promote traditional marriage without excluding nontraditional arrangements from its benefits. 134
C. Dependency
Martha Fineman has argued that we should rethink traditional notions

of dependency, challenging the notion that caretaking, including child
rearing, should be viewed just as any other choice (such as a "Porsche
Preference").1 35 Fineman asserts that certain forms of dependency are
virtually "inevitable" or "universal": childhood, severe illness or
disability, and old age. 136 Caretaking leads to "derivative dependency"
because the caretaker will need resources and accommodations from
society to survive while performing caregiving functions. 137 Fineman
argues that it is a social responsibility to meet such dependency needs,
because they are essential to the continuation of society.' 38 Caretaking
duties are generally assigned to the private sphere, however, where
131. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
132. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 933 (1992) (plurality opinion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
133. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 539-42 (1942); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 100-101 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that Roe and Skinner
effectively establish a right to procreate without government interference with a decision to have, or not
have, a child).
134. See Alaska Civ. Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 793 (Alaska 2005) ("There is no
indication here that granting or denying benefits to public employees with same-sex domestic partners
causes employees with opposite-sex domestic partners to alter their decisions about whether to marry.
There is no indication here that any of the plaintiffs, having been denied these benefits, will now seek
opposite-sex partners with an intention of marrying them. And if such changes resulted in sham or
unstable marriages entered only to obtain or confer these benefits, they would not seem to advance any
valid reasons for promoting marriage... .[Making benefits available to spouses may well promote
marriage; denying benefits to the same-sex domestic partners who are absolutely ineligible to become
spouses has no demonstrated relationship to the interest of promoting marriage.").
135. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1403
n.2 (2001); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the FoundationalMyths: Independence, Autonomy,
and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13, 21 n. 15 (2000).
136. See Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and SelfSufficiency, supranote 135, at 18.
137. Id. at 20.
138. See Fineman, Contractand Care, supra note 135, at 1410.
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families generally allocate the burden to women, whose caretaking goes
uncompensated. 139 In Fineman's view, caretaking creates
40 a social debt
owed by all members of society to caretakers as a group. 1
Fineman questions the economic narrative of choice and efficiency
for ignoring the constraints of life circumstances.I14 By using choice as
the touchstone of fairness, society effectively assigns personal
responsibility for circumstances beyond one's control that limit choice.
In addition, efficiency arguments fail to account for informational
failures:
[W]e may believe.., that a woman chose to become a mother, but does

this choice mean she has also consented to the societal conditions
attendant to that role and the many ways in which that status will
negatively [affect] her economic prospects? Did she even realize what
those costs might be? Is it even possible that society and culture might
have... [led] her astray on the
42 issue of costs, lied to her about the returns
and rewards of caretaking? 1

Moreover, does our sense of justice allow us to tolerate oppressive
conditions for caretakers, even if we acknowledge an element of choice?
Fineman readily acknowledges that her thesis is contrarian. Society

may well have accepted the idea of a social debt in the context of child
rearing, but otherwise we normalize individualism and selfsufficiency. 143 We ignore certain advantages, such as inherited wealth,
but describe state assistance to the poor as "welfare" or "subsidy."' 144
Nevertheless, Fineman challenges us to begin a dialogue about the
proper treatment of caretaking and move toward just compensation,
through the tax system or otherwise.

D. Tax Policy Implications
Marriage is one of our strongest traditions, but if the primary goal of
marriage is to facilitate child rearing, why not focus on this
characteristic directly rather than through a marriage proxy? Parenting
(whether or not undertaken by a child's biological parents) is very
expensive and involves a significant loss of autonomy; it seems more
likely that many potentially good parents are foregoing child rearing
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1411.
141. Id. at 1419.
142. Id. at 1420.
143. See Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and SelfSufficiency, supra note 135, at 24.
144. See id. at 23.

1434

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LAW REVIEW

[Vol.78

because of its costs. Entering into a marriage, in contrast, is very
inexpensive, generally triggers benefits, and (subject to minimal support
obligations) can generally be tailored to the parties' desires. Tax
subsidies could commoditize marriage
and weaken the norms that may
45
be responsible for its benefits. 1
Marriage is also easily terminated in a way that parenting generally is
not. One is free to become or not become a parent, but unlike being a
poor spouse or divorce, child neglect or abandonment usually involves
criminal liability. When an adult becomes a parent (whether via natural
pregnancy and childbirth, adoption, or surrogacy), the person is making
a permanent, long-term, and effectively irrevocable commitment to take
responsibility for the care of another human being. As much as we
might wish that marriage were truly "for better or for worse," the fact is
that this phrase describes parenting more accurately than marriage.
V. CONCLUSION

The joint return (and special rates for married taxpayers) should be
abolished as an incoherent penalty and subsidy of marriage. Joint filing
is indefensible as a component of a progressive tax system. Marriage
has many benefits, but the benefit most deserving of support is
marriage's connection with parenting. The contemporary reality is that
parenting will occur outside of marriage, and parenting has high social
benefits and high private costs. Although increased refundable child
credits would be the most progressive method of implementing a
parenting subsidy, 146 simply retaining head of household status seems
more likely.
Separate filing would help promote marriage neutrality in the tax
system, although it must include marriage penalties for a small
proportion of taxpayers to prevent spouses from shifting income from
property.
Separate filing essentially eliminates the bias against
secondary earners that the current system entails, but secondary earners
could still experience an average rate bias. In other words, secondary
earners would not likely be heads of household, so their rates would be
higher. The effect, however, should be much weaker than stacking the
secondary earner's income at the marginal rate of the primary earner. A
regime with a single rate schedule would go further toward eliminating
secondary earner bias.
The most compelling objection to retaining head of household status
145. Cf Wilson, supra note 104, at 878 (noting the perils of overly successful marriage subsidies).
146. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 388-89.

2010]

RETHINKING TAX PRIORITIES

1435

is distributional. One rationale for moving away from marriage is that
subsidizing marriage is heaping benefit on those who need it least, and
that we should more directly focus on behavior meriting subsidy.
Similarly, rate relief provides the most relief to high-income taxpayers.
But at least head of household provides an upside down subsidy for
defensible reasons, whereas marriage does not.
An objection to either credits or rate relief is that it may have little
relationship to spending on children. 47 The head of household rate
structure is not calibrated toward spending on children or social benefits
generated from such an investment. As Zelenak puts it, "a response
might be that it is acceptable for the benefit to go to the parents-it is
their reward for helping society by raising a good citizen.' 1 48 A
potential response more specific to the head of household status is that
wealthier families will generally invest more in their children, and
higher investments in human capital should create even greater
externalities. In addition, one might argue that higher income taxpayers
higher potential earnings to invest time
need more of a carrot to forgo
49
and resources in parenting. 1
The head of household status provides no benefit beyond the first
child. At first blush, this would appear suboptimal and unfair. A
possible response is that the autonomy burden of having the first child is
great, and the second child adds little marginal autonomy burden. The
nonfinancial contributions of parents are arguably quite burdensome and
deserve recognition through a subsidy scheme. A credit system might
also grant greater subsidies for the first child than for additional
children, in light of this consideration.
More work remains to be done on the question of how much support
for parenting or other family functions is optimal. An unduly low level
of support may endanger our long-term economic growth, but too much
support risks false success and the wrong people fulfilling sensitive
functions. We are averse to placing value on human life.' 50 But if we
think of certain traditionally private activities as involving collective
responsibility and a collective benefit, it is clear we will have to engage
this issue more carefully.

147.
148.
149.
150.

See id. at 389.
Id.
See Hoffer, supra note 99, at 96 n.216.
See Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration Health Care,N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2009, at MM38.
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